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Remarks of Stephen L. Cartertt
It is good to be back here in Minnesota. Before I give what I
describe as my neo-Kierkegaardian view of the professions with a
dash of post-modern theology thrown in, I want to say that this is a
tremendously useful conference. It is useful for professionals, by
which I mean people who work in self-governing professions, to
meditate from time to time on what it is that makes professions
special. However, my remarks are going to take this conference in
a slightly different direction than some of the issues raised this
morning, because I have something of a contrary view about the
role of professions-both the source and nature of the public obli-
gation of professions.
I would suggest that it is actually not helpful to try to figure out
what professions have in common. On the contrary, to figure out
what tlley have in common constitutes a kind of dangerous leveling
of groups that in important ways we ought to keep radically sepa-
rate. In fact, it is even in some ways a little bit dangerous to think
in terms of the ways that professions fit neatly into American soci-
ety. One of the reasons I call my remarks neo-Kierkegaardian, is
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that I am not persuaded that professions should try to fit into
American society.
Kierkegaard, as some of you know, wrote about Christianity
several hundred years ago. He argued that Christians should never
defend Christianity because it reduces Christianity to the status of
something that needs defending. I feel the same way about profes-
sions for reasons I am going to explain.
In my remarks this afternoon, I would like to talk about three
issues. First, the role of professions and why they are and should be
in some ways radically separate from a society in which they exist.
Second, the ways that professions often fail to be radically separate,
that is, working too hard to fit in. Third, what ought to be happen-
ing instead. Although my remarks are of some general application,
I am going to focus on three particular professions: clergy, lawyers,
and journalists. Why these three? Because I am a parent of a
household with two children of different ages. Why does that mat-
ter? Well if you are either a parent or have been a child, you know
the characteristics of such a household. The parents play the part
of the clergy-"thou shalt and thou shalt not!" The older child
plays the part of the lawyer-"but you didn't ever say that the rule
meant that!' And, the younger child plays the journalist-"oooooh,
I'm going to tell!"
What is the source of the public obligation of the professions?
The professions can only pardy answer this question themselves.
That is to say, you cannot draw the answer to this question entirely
from the norms and the collective social and historical knowledge
of the profession. On the contrary, I would like to draw the answer
from important aspects of democracy. I will offer a conception of
democracy and then try to explain how professions fit into that
conception.
Democracy exists, in part, to solve an ancient and knotty prob-
lem. All through human history, we have had these things, these
governments, these state apparatuses that have coercive power over
individuals. Governments can tell people what to do and back that
up with a sword or the gun. Individuals mayor may not want to do
what they are told to do. Even if these individuals decide they have
to do what the government tells them to do, they often chafe under
the rule of the state that orders them around.
Democracy exists, in part, as a device to persuade the governed
that they have a stake in following the commands of the sovereign.
They have a stake because they are part of what constitutes the sov-
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ereign. They vote, but more important than voting, they are, in
some theoretically formal sense, the government itself. Rather
than a separation between the government and the people, we
preach the people are the government. Of course that is not en-
tirely true because majorities do not always rule, and, when they do
rule, minorities often get very upset.
So how do you prevent any government, including a democ-
racy, from simply being totalitarian, or from simply ordering peo-
ple about with no possibility of appeal? One way is to split up your
democracy and turn it into a republic that divides powers, and lim-
its what government can do. That helps the people a little bit, but
there is another solution equally important, and this is where the
professions come in.
Ever since Alexis de Tocqueville visited America some 150
years ago, it has been a staple of American political theory, as well
as a staple of the commentary on our government, that one of the
things that makes America special is, as de Tocqueville said, "the
plentitude of associations" or, as we now like to think of them-
democratic intermediaries. An intermediary, in this usage, is an
institution that is not controlled by the government and yet exists
as an institution to which some people, but not all, owe voluntarily
some form of allegiance. Moreover, the institution itself may have
power in the community, and therefore becomes a power that the
formal apparatus, the state, has to reckon with.
A classic example of an intermediary institution is a church. A
church is neither established nor controlled by the government,
and yet it exists as an entity to which people who voluntarily join it
owe a kind of loyalty and allegiance. The government doesn't con-
trol the flow of information among members of this institution.
Why is this important? It is important because most of the modern
democratic struggles have been about what life means and who gets
to decide what life means. Whenever a state enacts a law, the state
is saying this is a moral meaning that life has. This is a "thou shalt
not," backed up with the gun.
One of the powerful roles of intermediary institutions is to
create a different set of meanings. Intermediary institutions can
say, "We think life is about this," no matter how many people think
life is about something different. The tension between the inter-
mediary institution that has one vision of life, and the state that has
another, improves the quality of democracy by weakening the
power of the state. The power is weakened because the members
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of the intermediary institution are exposed to and often fully be-
lieve a different set of meanings than the one the state proposes.
This means that such intermediary institutions, even though
they are an important function of democracy, are also in some
sense always and everywhere the enemies of the state. I do not
mean enemies in any sense of war. What I mean is that the state
trying to come up with one set of meanings will try ceaselessly to co-
opt the various intermediary institutions around it.
The classic example of this is the labor movement. In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the labor movement was
an explicitly radical movement and posed a genuine challenge to
capitalism. When it became regulated by the state, in the guise of
being protected by the state, it became less radical. It gained a
stake in the system and was co-opted. The co-optation, in this case,
may not have been a bad thing. It was probably important to the
survival of the unions, and it also improved the status of life in
America in important ways. Nevertheless, you see the process.
Once the unions became too powerful to be repressed, they were
brought into the state rather than left to be independent setters of
meaning floating around, potentially challenging the meanings the
state wants to pursue.
What does this have to do with professions? The professions,
at their best, act as important intermediary institutions. If a profes-
sion is going to think of itself as autonomous, it may be loyal to the
state and believe in the state's institutions, but it is ultimately pursu-
ing a set of meanings different from the state's. Moreover, profes-
sions are guided by a moral understanding that may be distinct
from the moral understanding that guides the state.
When a profession behaves this way, like any other intermedi-
ary institution, it is engaging in what the post-modern theologians
call, acts of resistance against the state. Resistance not in a sense
that one is necessarily going out and taking over buildings, or
something like that, but resistance in the sense that a profession
says, "We have a different view of what is the good and how life is to
be led than you do."
Let me give you examples from the three professions I men-
tioned. When lawyers defend unpopUlar clients or unpopular
causes, they give effect to a different set of meanings than the
meanings imposed, or attempted to be imposed, by a majority of
their fellow citizens who might say, "That fellow is so wicked he de-
serves no defense," or "That cause is so awful, it deserves no de-
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fense." When lawyers insist that someone or something unpopular
deserves a defense, they are saying that lawyers are guided by a dif-
ferent moral understanding. It is not that the society's understand-
ing is wicked, it is that lawyers, as a profession, are about a different
task than others are and lawyers are guided by the requirements of
that task.
Journalism, as a profession, is similar in many respects. When
journalists, in the exercise of genuine news judgment, report sto-
ries that most Americans wish they would ignore, or leave to die,
the journalists can also defend themselves by saying, "We are pursu-
ing a different ethic. Our understanding of our role is different
from the role that most Americans wish we would play. We are
guided by an autonomous understanding, because that is what it
means to be a profession even when that places us in opposition to
most Americans."
The clergy are a classic example of this proposition. When
clergy preach things that most Americans do not like, and some-
times move people to public action and causes that most Americans
do not like, they are playing the same role: intermediaries counsel-
ing resistance. What is more, they are saying, "We are guided by a
separate and distinct moral understanding from the one that
guides a majority of our fellow citizens. As an autonomous institu-
tion in society, we have an obligation to pursue the understanding
we think is right, rather than the understanding you think is right."
This has nothing to do with whether any particular person, in-
cluding myself, likes the particular moral understanding that any
profession is pursuing. Rather, one of the defining characteristics
of a profession should be to pursue this kind of autonomy, which
includes a moral understanding, that guides, in difficult moments,
the activities of its members.
Today, many professions either lack such an autonomous un-
derstanding or are not guided by it. I think that lawyers are often
so unpopular in America not so much because people don't like
the moral ethic that lawyers pursue, but rather, because people
doubt whether lawyers in fact are pursuing a moral ethic. Lawyers
do pursue a moral ethic, but it is misunderstood, even by lawyers.
Where do we get these professional ethics from? At the heart
of any profession playing the role of democratic intermediary, is a
moral principle, or set of moral principles, that are defensible-
moral principles that the profession genuinely believes, if properly
understood, people will admire (which has nothing do with admir-
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ing what gets done in the name of the principle).
Again, take the example of clergy. A member of the clergy
could say, "At the heart of my ethic is preaching and doing the will
of God." Most Americans would probably say, "That is fine." There
is a morally admirable professional ethic. It is possible for a par-
ticular member of the clergy to do and follow the will of God by
pressing forward on a cause that most Americans abhor. But the
question about the integrity of this professional ethic is not
whether when acted upon it leads to actions that people like.
Rather, it is whether the underlying moral principle is defensible,
not whether everything done in pursuit of that principle is defensi-
ble.
One of the reasons it is important to have such a principle is
that, without it, it is impossible for a profession to act with integrity.
You cannot be true to a principle if you do not have a principle. If
integrity means acting according to a principle-a morally admira-
ble principle-even when there is risk in doing so, then one must
first have a morally admirable principle. Before discussing what
some morally admirable principles might be, let me suggest what
some of them are not, for a seeming adherence to objectionable
principles may be part of the reason that today we are seeing so
much disrespect for so many professions around the nation.
Professions today are often contaminated by the competing
principles offered by the rest of the world. In particular, material-
ism as a principle has polluted several understandings of profes-
sions. And so it is not at all absurd to suggest, for example, that the
principle governing much ofjournalism as presented to the nation
is the principle that one must gain an audience. There is nothing
particularly admirable in that principle even though it is not sur-
prising that it has attained a certain prominence in journalism at a
time when market forms of language and market considerations
have come to dominate so much of American life. Yet the very idea
of having a profession that is radically autonomous from the rest of
society, is that the members of that profession can, in effect, sup-
port one another in saying: "We have a different goal."
For clergy, all too often it appears that the governing ethic is to
fill the seats without making a ruckus. Peter Berger, a sociologist,
has been studying for years the ways in which the market desire to
get people to come into the church or synagogue often trumps
other aspects of the message as the clergy sends the message in or-
der for the people to come in the door. Again, filling the seats is
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not a morally admirable principle, although it is certainly a market
driven principle.
With lawyers, the example of a principle which is not morally
admirable is making money; that is, when making money appears
to the public to be the goal of the profession rather than a by-
product of the value of the skill. When making money becomes
the goal, one does not have a morally admirable, defensible profes-
sional ethic.
Moreover, technocracy is never a morally admirable ethic.
The technocratic ethic says, "I have a valuable skill, but will market
to the highest bidder," and the language suggests a corollary-"Let
me do the bidder's bidding." Markets often operate this way, but it
is no business for a profession to be in. The claim of professions to
autonomy rests crucially on the ability to identify an underlying
ethic.
Consider the following example: a newspaper publishes a
scandalous story about a local politician. The politician is very
popular, and the community turns against the newspaper, not the
politician. How is the newspaper to defend itself? It is not enough
to say, "Well, we thought it would be a good story," nor, "We
thought people would be interested." "We thought it would be a
good story" just suggests that the goal is to gain an audience. "We
thought people would be interested" is the moral version of the
pornographer-give people what they want whether moral or not.
But Kierkegaard would say that the newspaper should not feel
obliged to defend itself if it believes that what it is doing is morally
admirable. Does it feel obliged to defend itself in reporting a
scandalous story about a politician? That, Kierkegaard might say,
reduces journalism to the status of a thing needing defense. For
the newspaper to feel obliged to defend itself suggests a certain
lack of confidence about the moral proposition actually guiding
the exercise of precious First Amendment freedoms. That be-
comes very problematic, because if one half of the First Amend-
ment is that it liberates journalism from state coercion, the other
half has to be that journalists believe they are engaged in a morally
valuable enterprise. If it is a morally valuable enterprise, it has to
be describable in some terms other than "we thought it would good
story," or "we thought people would be interested."
And, journalists should be the last people to offer as an expla-
nation of their professional ethic the public's right to know. Jour-
nalists should never offer that ethic because it suggests that the rna-
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tivating principle of the journalist is an assessment of something
about the motivating principles of the public. That is a category
mistake. The motivating principle of the journalist has to be some-
thing about the nature of journalism itself, or the relationship of
journalism to democracy.
The principle of helping citizens to discover what they need to
know to participate in self-governance, which is central to democ-
racy, is an example of what might be a morally admirable journalis-
tic principle. This suggests a connection to democracy, but it also
includes the word need, which is to say that journalists then exercise
actual news judgment, not market assessment, about what is actu-
ally needed by the public. And so, when a journalist discovers a
scandalous story about a politician, or about anyone else including
a fellow journalist, the question is not, "Will this make a good
story?" or "Can I sell papers or air time better with this?" But
rather, the question should be, "Is this something that I, in the ex-
ercise of my professional ethic, believe the public needs to know in
order to perform the functions of self-governance?" If the answer is
yes, the journalist reports the story and suffers the criticism, if any.
If the answer is no, the journalist declines to report the story even if
others are reporting it who have made different judgments.
When I say this to journalists, the answer I often get back is
that it is unrealistic to think that it is possible to work this way be-
cause the competition will bury you if you leave out the scandalous
stuff that others are reporting. But, if that is the answer, then jour-
nalists don't need the First Amendment, because the market pro-
vides breakfast cereal people want and automobiles people want,
without any need for constitutional protection. There is no obvi-
ous reason why journalists need a First Amendment, if their only
explanation of their function is we are giving people what they
want. In the absence of First Amendment protection, the market
will certainly allow journalists to do that! Consequently, the jour-
nalistic claim has to go not to what people want, but to what people
need. Journalism's claim to autonomy in society must be aimed at
allowing members of the profession to play this radical role of act-
ing according to a different set of meanings than others do.
What about the clergy? Why is it so bad, you might ask, for
members of the clergy to set a principle, even if an unwritten one,
of having to fill the seats? Mter all, you might say, it is fine to
preach the Word of God, but if nobody comes in the door, nobody
is going to hear it. That is a terrible argument in theological terms,
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but let's talk about it only in practical terms.
What roles do religions play in a democracy? Well, they playa
lot of different roles. One role is that of creating communities of
resistance and communities of different meanings. Religions have
the opportunity to create these communities in ways that are far
stronger in certain senses than other professions have. A number
of members of the clergy are complaining about a sense of margi-
nalization which some blame on the separation of church and
state. If clergy are marginalized by something in society, it is the
job of clergy to ignore that impediment in pursuit of the radical
autonomy of their profession.
For example, if a member of the clergy believes there is an im-
portant moral message that the society has to know, the question of
whether some people believe it appropriate or inappropriate for
members of the clergy to preach morality in politics should be ut-
terly irrelevant. This is because the members of the clergy, being
radically autonomous by hypothesis, are not to be guided by what
other members of society think. If Clergy A wants to impose God's
will on the rest of the nation, and Clergy A thinks God wants that,
then Clergy A has little choice but try to do that. If people don't
like it, then Clergy A will lose. Clergy A should not be deterred by
what other people think. If we believe that Clergy A should be de-
terred by what people would think, then we simply do not want the
Civil Rights Movement ever to have taken place. Clergy have to
take the view that their role in society, and their role in democracy,
is to preach what they believe to be true whether it upsets people or
not. If they believe that preaching what they believe to be true is
not going to fill the seats, that just shows a lack of faith in their own
role, and indeed, a lack of faith in their own faith.
This is sometimes a deeply problematic thing to do because
there is another kind of marginalization. Not the marginalization
that says, "I don't know if I'm allowed to do this in an democracy,"
but rather the marginalization that says, "Nobody is going to listen
to me," or, "I will simply be ridiculed and lampooned as some sort
of dangerous radical." One of my favorite theologians, Stanley
Hauerwas, who teaches at I?uke University, likes to say that clergy
should look forward to being labeled dangerous radicals. The last
thing that members of the clergy should want is people to think
that they are just like everybody else. Quite the contrary, Hauerwas
argues that if Clergy A thinks that he is just like everybody else, this
suggests that faith is not making any difference in Clergy A's life.
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Thus, the clergy, more than any other profession, should wel-
come society's labeling of them as radically different and out of
step with what is going on. That is precisely where the churches
ought to be-forever out of step; whether you think of the church
as a few steps ahead, or a few steps behind. If the professional ethic
is preaching the word of God, and doing it in the world without re-
gard to consequences to oneself, then of course it is often going to
be true that one will be preaching what gets a lot of people upset.
If one preaches what gets people upset, that is simply a part of the
job.
Indeed one of the worst things for preachers to do, is to try to
make their congregations comfortable. My wife and I are Episcopa-
lians. When we moved to New Haven about ten years ago, we asked
a number of people what church we should attend. Almost in-
variably, the first question they asked us was whether we were liber-
als or conservatives-the idea being that if we were liberals we would
like to go a liberal church to be told that God is a liberal and be-
lieves in all the same things we do, or if we were conservatives, to go
to a conservative church and be told that God is a conservative and
believes all the same things we do. The idea of a liberal or conser-
vative church is a terribly disturbing one. The notion that a church
should seek or embrace any sort of political affiliation is terrifying.
Once a church becomes involved in identifying itself politically,
whether with a political movement or a political party, it is already
begun to lose the ability to stand radically apart from that society
precisely because it is trying so hard to fit in. The Inquisition,
someone once said, came about when the church gave up the
power to die for its beliefs in exchange for the power to kill for its
beliefs. The power to die for one's beliefs is part of being radically
separate from society. The power to kill for one's beliefs is simply
part of protecting the status quo, which is not the proper role of
the church.
Now for the moment we have all been waiting for: Carter, heap
some of your anathema on lawyers. Do not misunderstand me-the
law is an admirable profession and an honorable one with a deeply
moral ethic at its core. If I did not believe that, I would not be able
to teach at a law school. I would not be able to encourage my stu-
dents to go out and become lawyers. The law at its best is a helping
profession, in much the same way that you can think of being a
doctor or, in some of its aspects, being a member of the clergy as a
helping profession. The law at its best involves the following para-
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digm: people who have problems in their lives, and those people
may be real individuals or juridical persons like corporations, come
to the lawyer and lay the problem in the lawyer's lap and say, fix
this. Lawyers, at their best, use the tools of their profession to try to
fix problems. They see those who come to them with problems as
individuals, humans, or corporations, or institutions, in need of as-
sistance. Lawyers, at their worst, view those who come to them as
profit centers-"How much money or how much publicity can I
make from this?" The corruption of materialism in law is the deep
love for those other aspects of the job.
The nature of law, especially as it is practiced in the United
States, is that fame and fortune often do accompany highly skilled
and highly able practitioners. There is nothing wrong with this. It
is where one's deepest instincts lie that makes the difference. I
propos"e the following as a possible morally admirable ethic to be
the center of the legal profession: using the tools of the legal sys-
tem to move the nation closer to the ideal of justice. You will no-
tice that there is in this morally admirable ethic no mention of the
client. There is no mention here, for example, of the lawyer's duty
of zealous advocacy within the bounds of the law. That is because
the service of clients is an epiphenomenon of the central principle,
but it is not the principle itself. If one believes that giving clients
what they want is the central principle, that is more simply a tech-
nocratic idea. It has no particular moral content, is not admirable
or defensible, and therefore cannot serve as the governing ethic of
a profession that wants to be radically autonomous.
You might say that lawyers do not want to be radically autono-
mous, but that is not true. The great tradition of lawyers in serving
a variety of roles helps to show that it is not true. As a number of
legal scholars have pointed out, for example, the principle law-
givers in America, are neither courts nor legislatures, nor adminis-
trative agencies, but rather lawyers. This is because most people's
principal experience with understanding their legal obligations,
and their legal rights, is working with a lawyer. Whether it is a mat-
ter of buying a house, defending a lawsuit, or establishing a busi-
ness, the lawyer becomes, in the life of that person, the law-giver. It
is the lawyer who comes forward to say these are the possibilities of
what you may do or what you may not do. Why does that matter?
It matters because every lawyer has the role of counselor. Every
lawyer has the opportunity in the counseling to do something be-
yond simply saying to a client, "Here are the options, you choose
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among them."
Thomas Schaffer, the great ethicist who teaches at the Univer-
sity of Notre Dame, tells the story of his days in the practice of law
back in the early 1960s-before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
adopted-when it was perfectly legal to discriminate in employ-
ment on the basis of race. Under the Kennedy Administration, the
Attorney General drafted and the President signed an order bar-
ring racial discrimination among those who receive federal con-
tracts. Schaffer was a young associate in a law firm at the time. A
client called the law firm and said it had a number of divisions, but
only one which did business with the federal government. The cli-
ent wanted to know whether it had to desegregate all of their divi-
sions, orjust that one. Schaffer was assigned to do research on that
issue; he came back and told the partner who had given the as-
signment his conclusion was that they had to desegregate only the
one division. In due course, the client called and said, ''You ha-
ven't answered my question." The partner said, ''Yes, my young as-
sociate here has done the research and as far as we can tell you only
have to desegregate the one division." The client said, "Thank you,
very much." The lawyer said, "Wait a minute, I'm not finished. As
a matter of morality, you ought to desegregate them all."
Schaffer gives this as an example of a controversial practice
among lawyers which involves giving the client what has to be for-
mally described as advice in the area of the client's business judg-
ment. The question about the lawyer in this case is, does the lawyer
simply provide the client the information asked for, or does the
lawyer go beyond that and give further advice in an area in which
the lawyer has no unique competence? The lawyer is no better
suited than the client to decide whether, as a matter of morality,
these other divisions ought to be desegregated. If the lawyer were
saying, ''You should do it now because I think they are going to
change this law next year, and you'll be ahead of the curve," or
''You should do it as a matter of prudence because I could be
wrong about this memo," that would be one thing. But that was
not what the lawyer was saying. The lawyer was saying, "I am giving
you moral advice."
I often tell that story when I talk to lawyers about ethics. The
most frequent response I get is that the moral advice goes beyond
the lawyer's proper role. Not because the lawyer was morally wrong
in his advice, no one of course says that, but rather, because it is
not that piece of advice for which the client contacted the lawyer in
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the first place. That may be a correct description of the client's de-
sires. I am not fully persuaded that it is a correct description of the
lawyer's role; or, if it is, it is a description of only technocracy. It is
a description that limits the lawyer's role and activities to doing
precisely what the client asks. That is a fairly recent view of what
lawyers do.
In the nineteenth century, at least in the treatises, the idea of
lawyer as officer of the court was taken quite seriously. So much so,
the treatise writers of that time would tell you that the lawyer's duty
to the client is no higher than third or fourth among the lawyer's
many moral obligations-to the nation, to the courts, and to jus-
tice. The minimum claim that I want to make, however, is that the
lawyer's duty to justice is higher than the lawyer's duty to an indi-
vidual client. Does that mean the lawyer's obligation is to turn in a
client that commits a crime? Quite the contrary, defending a client
everybody believes is guilty contributes to justice. Others do not
agree with this concept. It is very difficult to persuade most mem-
bers of the public that defending a client everyone believes is guilty
is a contribution to justice.
There was a fascinating public opinion survey ten or fifteen
years ago in which the following question was asked: "Do you think
that people accused of child sexual abuse should be entitled to the
same legal protections as defendants accused of other crimes?"
The public overwhelmingly answered, "No!" While about three-
fourths of the public answered, "No," about three-fourths of lawyers
answered, ''Yes.'' This was part of a survey comparing attitudes on
justice between the public and lawyers. The fact that the public
says no, does not mean that lawyers are wrong and the fact that law-
yers say yes, does not mean that the public is wrong. The different
answers are generated in part by the different goals that each
group is pursuing. When lawyers, as a profession, stand up en
masse with different answers to tough questions like that, they are
stating that lawyers have a different point of view that may be radi-
cally different from what most people think. This differing point of
view is nevertheless generated by our self conception as a profes-
sion. I believe that is a correct approach because the profession
must believe that it rest on a moral understanding of the world,
even when it leads to answers that are radically different from the
answer that others might give.
Most people in America are good, kind, thoughtful, and very
moral people. Their morality leads them to a particular judgment
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about what ought to be done in the world. Professionals should be
precisely the same, except that they should give their fealty to a set
of moral judgments that will often be different from what most
Americans share. I am not here claiming that professional ethics
are better or worse, just different, and I hope, morally defensible.
Nothing that I have said should be taken to suggest that when
there is a conflict between professionals on the one hand, and the
m;:yority of the citizens on the other, that the professionals should
always prevail. But as a simple matter of democratic theory, the
professions should often prevail. As a simple matter of democratic
theory, the autonomy of the professions is important. It is impor-
tant because only their autonomy, which begins with the attach-
ment to a moral principle, allows the professions to display the
radical distinctiveness that is needed in order to act as reliable
democratic intermediaries.
We live in a nation in which far too many intermediaries have
broken down. Labor unions are less powerful in most of the coun-
try than they once were, local fraternal organizations are collaps-
ing, and many churches are losing members. But the professions,
if they want to be, can still be strong and radically autonomous as
long as they do not become so corrupted by the world that they
find the greatest goal is to make money, fill the seats, or to gain an
audience. The propounding and the nurturing of that radical
autonomy that is the greatest public service the professions can do
for America.
